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I. INTRODUCTION: BIVENS ACTIONS AND THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
It is well-established that plaintiffs alleging violation of their federal or state 
constitutional rights may sue for an injunction to halt continuing unconstitutional 
government action.1 Whether plaintiffs may seek compensation for injuries already 
suffered, however, varies by jurisdiction.2  
 
1.  See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
2.  See Jennifer Friesen, State Constitutional Law: Litigating Individual Rights, Claims, and 
Defenses § 7.07(1)–7.07(2) (4th ed. 2006) (discussing opinions from thirty-eight states). 
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Suits seeking money damages for constitutional violations are commonly 
called Bivens actions,3 after the landmark 1971 case Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.4 In Bivens, the United States Supreme 
Court held that the Fourth Amendment could, of its own force, support a cause of 
action for damages.5 In the years following Bivens, the Court extended its rationale 
to claims alleging violations of Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights as well.6 And 
while for decades the Court has been disinclined to extend the availability of money 
damages to enforce other constitutional rights,7 Bivens actions remain an 
important pathway for plaintiffs to vindicate their rights under the federal 
constitution.8 
In some cases, however, plaintiffs may wish to bring claims to vindicate their 
rights under state constitutions as well.9 Claims under state constitutions may be 
preferable to federal claims for a number of reasons: state constitutions may afford 
rights not recognized by the federal constitution; they may have more protective 
interpretations of parallel rights; they may have schemes of immunities and 
defenses less favorable to defendants; and decisions protecting rights 
independently derived from state law are not subject to review or reversal by the 
Supreme Court.10 
Dozens of states have taken up the issue of implied constitutional damages 
actions in the nearly fifty years since Bivens was decided, but nothing like a 
consensus has emerged.11 In a recent case considering the availability of damages 
under the Iowa Constitution, the Iowa Supreme Court surveyed other state court 
opinions on the issue.12 It found cases from fourteen states allowing money 
damages,13 cases from fourteen states disallowing the same,14 and described the 
landscape as “nearly equally divided.”15  
 
3.  Bivens action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
4.  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
5.  Id. at 397. 
6.  Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 230 (1979) (Fifth Amendment); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 
17–18 (1980) (Eighth Amendment). 
7.  See infra Part II.b. 
8.  See generally Joseph G. Cook & John L. Sobieski, Jr., Civil Rights Actions, ¶ 14.01 (Matthew 
Bender & Co. 2019). 
9.  FRIESEN, supra note 2, § 1.03(2). 
10.  Id. 
11.  See FRIESEN, supra note 2, § 7.07(1)–7.07(2) (discussing opinions from thirty-eight states). 
12.  Godfrey v. State, 898 N.W.2d 844, 856–57 (Iowa 2017). 
13.  Id. at 856 n.2. 
14.  Id. at 857 n.3. 
15.  Id. at 856. While the Iowa court’s collection of cases is a helpful starting point for the 
researcher, it is important to note the limitations of its jurisdictional nose-counting. First, sorting 
jurisdictions into pro- and anti-damages camps oversimplifies the issue: most state opinions do not 
frame their holdings as whether damages are always or never available, but address whether damages 
are available for the violation of a particular constitutional provision under a particular set of facts. Thus, 
allowance or disallowance of a damages remedy may not reflect the availability of damages as a general 
matter, but rather the peculiarities of the provision at issue. Second, many states cannot tidily be placed 
on one side of the issue or the other. At least eight states which have found damages unavailable for 
certain violations have held, or have suggested they would hold, damages available in other 
circumstances. See FRIESEN, supra note 2, § 7.07(1)–7.07(2) (providing state-by-state summaries of 
decisions recognizing or rejecting damage claims under state constitutions). These states are Arizona, 
Connecticut, Florida, Michigan, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. Id. 
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Perhaps this is not a surprising result. For one, Supreme Court jurisprudence 
in the area has changed dramatically over time and has occasionally taken 
contradictory positions.16 But even Bivens itself produced five separate opinions, 
including three dissents.17 Accordingly, state courts seeking guidance from federal 
caselaw will easily find support for a variety of divergent positions. 
Like most states,18 Idaho has no statute explicitly allowing plaintiffs to seek 
money damages in suits alleging violation of the state constitution. Unlike many 
states,19 however, no Idaho appellate court has addressed the issue of whether 
such actions are implied under the state constitution. Given the silence of the Idaho 
appellate courts, and the lack of consensus on the issue among the states, one 
might expect the Federal Court for the District of Idaho to treat the availability of 
state constitutional damages as an open question. Surprisingly, it has firmly 
decided, without certifying the question to the Idaho Supreme Court, that Bivens 
actions are not available under the Idaho Constitution.20 It has accordingly 
dismissed plaintiffs’ state constitutional claims in more than twenty cases between 
2006 and 2019.21  
The court appears to have first held that no private cause of action arises 
under the Idaho Constitution in Boren v. City of Nampa.22 In Boren, the court 
dismissed a laundry list of claims brought against city officials by pro se litigants 
involving a zoning dispute.23 These included a claim that the defendants violated 
Article I of the Idaho Constitution.24 The district court acknowledged that the Idaho 
Supreme Court had been silent on the issue, but held it was “confident” Idaho 
courts would not recognize such a cause of action.25  
The source of the court’s confidence is unclear: the Boren court cited two 
cases from outside jurisdictions to support its holding, but it offered no discussion 
 
16.  See infra Part II.b. 
17.  See infra Part II.a. 
18.  FRIESEN, supra note 2, § 7.01. 
19.  FRIESEN, supra note 2, § 7.07. 
20.  See Boren v. City of Nampa, No. CIV 04-084-S-MHW, 2006 WL 2413840, at *10 (D. Idaho Aug. 
18, 2006). 
21.  See, e.g., Kangas v. Wright, No. 1:15-cv-00577-CWD, 2016 WL 6573943, at *6 (D. Idaho Nov. 
4, 2016) (citing five previous cases to support a finding that the District of Idaho “has repeatedly refused 
to recognize a ‘direct cause of action for violations of -the Idaho Constitution[,]’” (quoting Campbell v. 
City of Boise, No. CV-07-532-S-BLW,  
2008 WL 2745121, at *1 (D. Idaho July 11, 2008)). Though opinions frequently do not distinguish 
between claims for money damages and equitable relief, see id., at least one case has allowed state 
constitutional claims to proceed where the plaintiff sought an equitable remedy. Hancock v. Idaho Falls 
Sch. Dist. No. 91, No. CV-04-537-E-BLW, 2006 WL 2095264, at *1–2 (D. Idaho July 27, 2006) 
(reconsidering summary judgment on a claim under the Idaho Constitution’s free speech provision after 
plaintiff clarified he was seeking equitable relief). 
22. Boren, 2006 WL 2413840, at * 10. 
23.  Id. at *1–3. 
24.  Id. at *10. Article I sets forth Idaho’s Declaration of Rights in twenty-three sections, see IDAHO 
CONST. art. I, but plaintiffs apparently did not allege violation of any section with specificity. See Boren, 
2006 WL 2413840, at *1. 
25.  Boren, 2006 WL 2413840, at *10. 
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of those cases nor any analysis of Idaho law.26 And despite the many constitutional 
claims dismissed in the District of Idaho since Boren, the court has devoted almost 
no additional analysis to the question. Even the district court’s most substantial 
treatment of the issue omits discussion of Idaho law.27  
This Comment argues that the District of Idaho is mistaken—the Idaho 
Supreme Court, if it were to address the question, would hold that the Idaho 
Constitution does support a cause of action for damages in some cases. In Part II, I 
will discuss constitutional tort actions under federal law to enforce the federal 
Constitution. While the focus of this Comment is the availability of an action for 
damages under Idaho law to enforce the Idaho Constitution, discussion of Bivens 
actions in federal courts is important for two reasons. First, the development of 
federal law in this area highlights many of the same constitutional and policy 
problems facing state courts when they confront the issue. In particular, it 
illuminates the tension between assuring the vitality of constitutional rights 
through meaningful enforcement mechanisms and respecting limits on the power 
of the judicial branch in a system of divided government. 
 Second, because state courts considering the availability of Bivens actions 
under their constitutions frequently analogize to (or distinguish from) federal law 
on the topic, understanding the development of federal constitutional tort 
jurisprudence is necessary to contextualize these decisions. In particular, I will show 
the skepticism that currently defines the federal approach to Bivens actions is based 
on concerns inapposite in the state court context, generally, and in Idaho, 
particularly. Thus, while some courts have found the Supreme Court’s hostility to 
Bivens actions persuasive,28 the line of federal cases limiting Bivens actions should 
bear little weight, if any, when considering the availability of damages to enforce 
rights under the Idaho Constitution.  
In Part III, I argue that the availability of an implied cause of action under the 
state constitution is the only position consistent with Idaho law. As already noted, 
no Idaho appellate court has addressed the issue, but Idaho Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Tucker v. State29 indicates how the Court would rule. I will show that 
Tucker demonstrates the Court rejects “rights essentialism”—a fiction forged in 
 
26.  See id.  
27.  See Sommer v. Elmore Cty., 903 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1074–75 (D. Idaho 2012). Sommer is the 
District’s only published case addressing implied constitutional damages actions in Idaho and is the only 
case to devote more than a few sentences to the topic. While Sommer does not analyze any Idaho law, 
it curiously relies on Katzberg v. Regents of University of California, 58 P.3d 339 (Cal. 2002), as persuasive 
authority to deny a private right of action. Sommer, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 1074–75. Katzberg, however, 
does not stand for the proposition that damages are generally unavailable under the California 
Constitution; indeed, California courts explicitly recognize damages are available to enforce some 
provisions of its Constitution. See Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 644 (Cal. 1994) (holding money damages 
are available for violation of the state constitutional right to privacy). Rather, Katzberg established a 
two-step framework to analyze California constitutional damages claims: in step one, the court looks at 
the text and history of the state constitution to determine if damages must be available; in step two the 
court determines if damages should be available. Katzberg, 58 P.3d at 353–55. While the Katzberg court 
found that damages should not have been available to remedy the particular interest at issue in that 
case (deprivation of a due process liberty interest in future employment), id. at 356–57, the opinion 
simply does not support the proposition for which District of Idaho cited it—that damages must not be 
available in any instance. 
28.  See, e.g., Cantrell v. Morris, 849 N.E.2d 488, 501–04 (Ind. 2006). 
29.  Tucker v. State, 394 P.3d 54, 61, 162 Idaho 11, 18 (2017). 
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response to separation of powers concerns that de-links rights and remedies—in 
favor of the intuitive position that rights and remedies exist in a 1:1 correlation. 
Thus, under Idaho law, the courts may not defer to the other branches to enforce 
constitutional rights. 
 Finally, in Part IV, I address how Idaho courts should implement Bivens 
actions in Idaho. I argue Idaho courts must allow a damages remedy where plaintiffs 
can prove violation of self-executing provisions of the state constitution. I argue 
further that the state or its political subdivisions are the only proper defendants in 
an action directly under the Idaho Constitution, and defendants should be held 
strictly liable where the conduct causing injury is fairly attributable to the 
government. Lastly, I address the propriety of equitable versus legal relief and the 
availability of punitive damages. 
II. BIVENS V. SIX UNKNOWN AGENTS OF FEDERAL BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND 
INHERENT JUDICIAL REMEDIAL AUTHORITY UNDER THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 
A. Summary of the opinions in Bivens  
Bivens stemmed from a 1965 warrantless raid on the home of Webster Bivens 
by agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.30 Bivens was handcuffed in front of 
his wife and children, and agents threatened to arrest the entire family.31 They then 
searched the home from “stem to stern,” arrested and interrogated Bivens, and 
subjected him to a strip search.32 No incriminating evidence was found, however, 
and the charges against Bivens were ultimately dismissed.33  
Bivens claimed the agents’ conduct violated his Fourth Amendment rights, 
was unreasonable, and caused him humiliation, embarrassment, and emotional 
distress.34 He sued the agents in federal court seeking $15,000 in damages from 
each.35 The government argued that if the plaintiff was to have redress, his cause 
of action arose under state tort law, not the Constitution.36 In the government’s 
view, the Fourth Amendment was not an affirmative source of protection, but a 
mere limit on the agents’ ability to defend their conduct as a valid exercise of 
federal power.37  
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan rejected this argument as an “unduly 
restrictive” interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.38 Though Congress had never 
enacted a statute allowing damages as a remedy to enforce the Fourth 
 
30.  Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. 
31.  Id.  
32.  Id. 
33.  Id. at 390. 
34.  Id. at 389–90. 
35.  Id. at 390. 
36.  Bivens, 403 U.S. at 390. 
37.  Id. at 390–91. 
38.  Id. at 391.  
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Amendment, the Court held that Mr. Bivens could nevertheless sue for damages.39 
The Court observed that the Constitution guaranteed an “absolute right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures,” and where that right has been violated, 
the Court’s role was to “be alert to adjust [its] remedies so as to grant the necessary 
relief.”40 
In taking this pragmatic approach, the Court applied the doctrine of implied 
causes of action—a doctrine developed in state courts to fill remedial gaps left open 
when legislatures create statutory rights but are silent as to the means of their 
enforcement—to secure Constitutional rights.41 This is implicit in the majority 
opinion, but is express in Justice Harlan’s concurrence.42 Harlan cited several cases 
where, in the absence of a legislatively created cause of action, the Court had 
exercised judicial authority to accord damages when necessary to effectuate 
“substantive social policy embodied in an act of positive law.”43 He then noted that 
the Fourth Amendment is such a law, articulating a social policy “aimed 
predominantly at restraining the Government as an instrument of the popular 
will.”44 Therefore, since courts are “capable of making the types of judgment 
concerning causation and magnitude of injury necessary to accord meaningful 
compensation for invasion” of those rights, fashioning a damages remedy was not 
just permitted, but compelled by judicial duty.45 As applied to Bivens’ case, the 
necessity of damages was apparent: an injunction could provide no relief because 
the same harm was unlikely to recur to the plaintiff, and the exclusionary rule could 
afford no relief because he was never charged with a crime.46 Thus, as Harlan 
succinctly put it: “For people in Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or nothing.”47 
Three Justices dissented in Bivens, and all three decried the majority’s 
recognition of an implied action for damages as an imposition by the Court into the 
legislative sphere.48 According to the dissents, the business of determining 
remedies—whether for common law torts or constitutional torts—belonged solely 
 
39.  Id. 
40.  Id. at 392 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). 
41.  FRIESEN, supra note 2, § 7.05(3). As summarized by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, the 
doctrine of implied causes of action provides:  
 
When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain conduct 
but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is 
appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of 
the provision, accord to an injured member of the class a right of action, using a suitable existing tort 
action or a new cause of action analogous to an existing tort action. 
 
 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A (Am. Law. Inst. 1979). 
42.  Bivens, 403 U.S. at 402 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
43.  Id. at 402 n.4. 
44.  Id. at 404. 
45.  Id. at 409. 
46.  Id. at 409–10. 
47 . Id. at 410.  
48.  See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411–12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“We would more surely preserve the 
important values of the doctrine of separation of powers—and perhaps get a better result—by 
recommending a solution to the Congress as the branch of government in which the Constitution has 
vested legislative the power.”); Id. at 429 (Black, J., dissenting) (“The task of evaluating the pros and cons 
of creating judicial remedies for particular wrongs is a matter for Congress and the legislatures of the 
States.”); Id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing the majority opinion as “judicial legislation”). 
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to Congress.49 In the words of Justice Black, “the fatal weakness in the [majority’s] 
judgment is that neither Congress nor the State of New York has enacted legislation 
creating [an action for damages]. For us to do so is, in my judgment, an exercise of 
power that the Constitution does not give us.”50 But perhaps the starkest contrast 
with the Court’s view that it possessed authority to award damages is found in 
Justice Burger’s dissent. Though the bulk of Burger’s dissent involves a collateral 
discussion of the exclusionary rule, his view on inherent judicial authority to award 
damages was made clear with an approving nod to the words of James Bradley 
Thayer: 
And if it be true that the holders of legislative power are 
careless or evil, yet the constitutional duty of the court remains 
untouched; it cannot rightly attempt to protect the people, by 
undertaking a function not its own. On the other hand, by 
adhering rigidly to its own duty, the court will help, as nothing 
else can, to fix the spot where responsibility lies, and to bring 
down on that precise locality the thunderbolt of popular 
condemnation.51  
Thus, by this view, the analytical path begins and ends with the question of 
whether the legislature has approved damages for constitutional violations—only 
then may damages be awarded.  
B. The constriction of federal judicial remedial authority after Bivens 
Bivens is still good law, but the Court has recently suggested it would have 
reached a different result if it were decided today.52 Indeed, the limited view of 
judicial remedial authority urged by the Bivens dissents has become a dominant 
theme in federal constitutional tort jurisprudence.53 Understanding how this shift 
occurred, and the basis for it, is essential to understanding why the rationale behind 
Bivens—and not the rationale for its later limitation—applies under the Idaho 
constitution.   
The limitation of the Bivens holding began with two exceptions suggested by 
the opinion itself.54 The majority implied that damages may not be available (1) for 
constitutional violations where “special factors counsel[ed] hesitation in the 
absence of affirmative action by Congress[,]” or (2) in situations where Congress 
obviated the need for damages by designating an alternative, equally effective 
remedy.55 Initially, the Court construed these as narrow exceptions to the rule that 
“victims of a constitutional violation by a federal agent have a right to recover 
 
49.  Id. at 411–12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 427–28 (Black, J., dissenting); Id. at 430 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).   
50.  Id. at 428 (Black, J., dissenting). 
51.  Bivens, 403 U.S. at 412 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
52.  Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1856–57 (2017). 
53.  See id. 
54.  See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396–97. 
55. Id. 
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damages against the official in federal court despite the absence of any statute 
conferring such a right.”56 For instance, in Carlson v. Green, the Court reiterated 
that Congress could obviate the need for a Bivens remedy by providing for 
alternative recovery, but indicated it would stringently evaluate whether that 
remedy was “equally effective.”57 In that case, the Court held that availability of a 
remedy for wrongful death under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)58 could not 
prevent the mother of a deceased federal prisoner from seeking damages for 
violation of the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights.59 Because the FTCA remedy 
would have a lesser deterrent effect on federal officials, did not permit punitive 
damages, did not allow a jury trial, and was contingent on the availability of a tort 
cause of action under state law, the Court found it was less effective than a 
damages remedy directly under the Eighth Amendment.60  
Likewise, “special factors” appeared mostly limited to situations where money 
damages would encroach into a field when there was a clear textual commitment 
of authority to another branch of government.61 Thus, the Constitution’s grant to 
Congress of “plenary control over . . . the military establishment” was a special 
factor counseling against recognition of a Bivens remedy where military personnel 
sued superior officers for constitutional violations.62 By contrast, the prison guards 
in Carlson were liable in damages because they did not “enjoy such independent 
status in our constitutional scheme as to suggest that judicially created remedies 
against them might be inappropriate.”63  
However, beginning with Bush v. Lucas, the Court greatly expanded the scope 
of both exceptions by holding that congressional creation of an alternative remedy 
could itself be a special factor.64 In Bush, a NASA engineer was demoted after 
making public statements critical of the agency.65 The engineer appealed his 
demotion to the Federal Employee Appeals Authority, and after his appeal was 
denied, sought review by the Civil Service Commission’s Appeals Review Board.66 
While that review was pending, the engineer sued for damages resulting from his 
demotion, alleging it was a violation of his First Amendment rights.67 His claim was 
dismissed by the district court and the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the 
dismissal.68 The Court assumed that administrative remedies available to the 
engineer were less effective than a damages remedy, but held it would not 
recognize a Bivens action because the engineer’s claim arose “out of an 
employment relationship that is governed by comprehensive procedural and 
 
56. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980). 
57. Id. at 18–19.  
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2018). 
59. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 17–19. 
60. Id. at 21–23. 
61. Id. at 19.  
62.  Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983). 
63.  Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19. 
64.  See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388–90 (1983). 
65.  Id. at 369–70. 
66.  Id. at 370–71. 
67.  Id. at 371.  
68.  Id. at 371, 390.  
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substantive provisions giving meaningful remedies” and the existence of that 
scheme constituted “special factors counselling hesitation.”69 
Similarly, in Schweiker v. Chilicky the Court denied a Bivens remedy to disabled 
persons alleging due process violations after they were improperly denied Social 
Security benefits.70 Here, too, the Court found that the existence of a 
“comprehensive” appeal and remediation scheme was a special factor which 
precluded the availability of a Bivens action.71 Notably, in Chilicky the Court 
acknowledged that some claimants who were wrongfully denied benefits would not 
be limited to an alternative remedy, but would have no remedy at all.72 This was 
because claimants whose benefits were restored lacked standing to challenge the 
prior denial.73 Despite the total lack of remedy for these claimants, the Court 
concluded that the gap was the result of “congressional inaction [that] ha[d] not 
been inadvertent[,]” and held “[w]hen the design of a Government program 
suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial 
mechanisms for constitutional violations” it would not recognize a Bivens remedy.74 
The Supreme Court recently described the decision whether to recognize 
Bivens remedies as involving two steps—consideration of the adequacy of 
alternative remedies, followed by consideration of “special factors.”75 But Bush and 
Chilicky show that where mere existence of a remedial scheme is a “special factor,” 
assessing the adequacy of remedies within that scheme will be dispensed with 
altogether.76 As Professor Anya Bernstein has observed, since Bush v. Lucas: 
special factors analysis has evolved into an inquiry as to whether 
Congress has indicated that it wishes to reserve decisionmaking about 
remediation in some area for itself. If Congress has indicated that it has 
already provided all the remedies it thinks are due, or that it prefers 
that no remedies at all be provided, courts find that special factors 
preclude recognizing a constitutional damages remedy.77 
In other words, special factors analysis has become a species of inter-branch 
field preemption which swallows questions of adequacy whole: anytime there is 
indicia of congressional consideration of remedies within an area—by providing a 
remedy, or even as in Chilicky, by not inadvertently not providing a remedy—the 
judiciary will be preempted from exercising its authority. From a functional 
perspective then, the Court has adopted an interpretation of “special factors” that 
results in an anomalous situation: while the Constitution’s grant of individual rights 
 
69.  Id. at 368, 377, 388–90. 
70.  Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 424 (1988). 
71.  Id. at 422. 
72.  Id. at 424–25. 
73   Id. 
74.  Id. at 423. 
75.  Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007). 
76.  See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983); See also Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988). 
77.  Anya Bernstein, Congressional Will and the Role of the Executive in Bivens Actions: What Is 
Special About Special Factors?, 45 IND. L. REV. 719, 720–21 (2012). 
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may be “aimed predominantly at restraining the Government as an instrument of 
the popular will,”78 the branches who are to be restrained have near total discretion 
in their enforcement when money damages are the only meaningful remedy for 
their violation. Though the Court’s constitutional tort jurisprudence began in Bivens 
with a focus on judicial responsibility to provide remedies necessary to effectuate 
the counter-majoritarian purposes of the Constitution, it now is much nearer to the 
ideal espoused in Justice Burger’s dissent of total deference to the elected branches 
for the enforcement of individual rights. 
C. The rationale for limiting the remedial authority of the federal courts 
The limiting of Bivens has corresponded with a trend toward limiting the 
equitable and common-law authority of the federal courts, generally.79 This has 
included the repudiation of the federal doctrine of implied causes of action in the 
statutory context and disavowal of the precedent relied upon by Justice Harlan to 
support his concurrence in Bivens.80  
This trend has been driven by “a view of the Article III courts as ‘federal 
tribunals,’ cabined within the separate domains of the different branches and 
lacking inherent remedial authority.”81 In the words of Justice Scalia writing for the 
majority in Alexander v. Sandoval in 2001, “[r]aising up causes of action where a 
statute has not created them may be a proper function for common-law courts, but 
not for federal tribunals.”82 Later in the same term, Justice Scalia criticized Bivens 
as “a relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to 
create causes of action—decreeing them to be ‘implied’ by the mere existence of a 
statutory or constitutional prohibition[,]” and advocated limiting Bivens to “the 
precise circumstances that [it] involved.”83  
The trend has inspired criticism, as well as cynicism, since the practical 
consequences of limiting remedial power (i.e., greater difficulty pursuing civil rights 
claims) have corresponded with the perceived policy preferences of the Justices 
advancing that limitation.84 But Scalia’s position is certainly not without a basis in 
history. At the time of the founding, the remedial authority of the federal courts 
was limited—and complicated—by concerns of federalism:  
A remedial right logically entails a correlative remedial duty on 
the part of the government, and a remedial duty logically entails 
remedial power. But the overriding objective of the Bill of Rights 
 
78.  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 404 
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
79.  See Helen Herschkoff & Stephen Loffredo, State Courts and Constitutional Socio-Economic 
Rights: Exploring the Underutilization Thesis, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 923, 978 (2011). 
80.  Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001) (discussing the Court’s rejection of J.I. Case 
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)). 
81.  Herschkoff & Loffredo, supra note 79, at 979. 
82.  Alexander, 532 U.S. at 287 (quoting Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 
501 U.S. 350, 365 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)); see also Antonin 
Scalia, The Rule of Law As A Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1989). 
83.  Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
84.  See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Progressive Political Theory and Separation of Powers on the Burger 
and Rehnquist Courts, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 405 (2004); Nelson Lund, The Rehnquist Court's Pragmatic 
Approach to Civil Rights, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 249 (2004). 
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. . . was to constrain—not to aggrandize—federal power. The 
Framers understood rights enforcement and remedy provision as 
the primary realm of state courts. They drafted Article III carefully 
to circumscribe the jurisdiction of federal courts.85 
Moreover, Congress did not even provide an avenue for bringing claims under the 
Constitution until it created federal question jurisdiction by the Act of March 3, 
1875.86  Until this time, state courts were the exclusive venues available to plaintiffs 
alleging constitutional violations.87  
Justice Harlan resolved this issue by combining the Founders’ entrustment of 
remediation to the states with the “contemporary modes of jurisprudential thought 
which appeared to link ‘rights’ and ‘remedies’ in a 1:1 correlation” to find a cause 
of action must be implied.88 Whether or not, as a general matter, this is within the 
inherent authority of the federal courts is a complicated question scholars have 
spent thousands of words attempting to untangle,89 but the recent attitude of the 
Supreme Court toward implied causes of action is unmistakable: “expanding 
the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.”90  
D. Inapplicability of the rationale to state courts generally, and Idaho 
particularly 
While several state courts have analogized to the federal trend limiting Bivens 
while disallowing damages claims under their constitutions,91 these decisions rarely 
note the differences between state and federal schemes of government. State 
constitutions reflect judgments of their framers with respect to the allocation of 
powers between branches of government, and these judgments often differ from 
the allocation of power at the federal level.92 Some constitutions depart from the 
federal scheme by express terms, but even where the language of a state provision 
is substantially similar to a federal provision, it may well have been adopted with a 
different intent.93 Additionally, unease at the federal level with allowing an 
unelected judiciary to expose the public fisc to liability is lessened by the fact that 
most judges at the state level are elected.94 
 
85.  Benjamin Plener Cover, The First Amendment Right to a Remedy, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1741, 
1786 (2017). 
86.  Alfred Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109, 1135 (1969). Federal question 
jurisdiction is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). Id. at 1114. 
87.  Hill, supra note 86, at 1135. 
88.  Bivens, 403 U.S. at 400 n.3. 
89.  See Hill, supra note 86. 
90.  Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). 
91.  See, e.g., Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 58 P.3d 339, 344 (Cal. 2002); Kelley Prop. Dev., 
Inc. v. Town of Lebanon, 627 A.2d 909, 921 (Conn. 1993); Barrios v. Haskell Cty. Pub. Facilities Auth., 432 
P.3d 233, 239 n.24 (Okla. 2018). 
92.  See David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197, 1200–01 (1992). 
93.  Id. 
94.  See Am. Judicature Soc’y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES (2013), 
http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/Judicial_Selection_Charts_1196376173077.pdf. 
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The most important distinction between state and federal courts with regard 
to Bivens actions, however, is the differing scope of jurisdiction in state and federal 
courts. Judicial implication of damages remedies may pose knotty questions in 
Article III courts of limited jurisdiction, but it is widely accepted that “state courts 
remain common-law generalists with equitable and inherent authority to create 
law, shape policy, and devise remedies.”95 Indeed, Justice Scalia’s comments in both 
Alexander and Malesko draw a clear distinction between “federal tribunals” and 
common-law courts.96 Thus, to the extent the limited jurisdiction of the federal 
judiciary has underpinned the narrow availability of Bivens actions at the federal 
level, these decisions should have little persuasive weight in the states. 
Each of the foregoing distinctions applies in Idaho. The framers of the Idaho 
Constitution—like much of the territorial population they represented—were 
motivated by “strongly held beliefs in individualism” and a distrust of government 
power.97 Thus when they drafted the Idaho Declaration of Rights, they did so with 
a keen eye to secure individual liberties, and adopted it as the first article of the 
constitution.98 Furthermore, judges in Idaho, including justices of the Supreme 
Court, are elected officials,99 obviating the separation of powers concerns that arise 
at the federal level if unelected judges may enter damages awards against the 
government in the absence of a legislative appropriation. 
Finally, the Idaho Supreme Court has acknowledged its common-law power 
to find implied causes of action.100 And though the Court has never applied the 
doctrine to a constitutional provision, there is no reason to suspect the doctrine 
should not apply. Idaho has cited section 874A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
in explaining its own doctrine of implied causes of action and the Restatement’s 
comment to that section clarifies that the doctrine applies to constitutional 
provisions.101 Furthermore, 874A finds its roots in the English common law—where 
“the notion that unconstitutional actions by government officials could lead to 
 
95.  Herschkoff & Loffredo, supra note 79, at 979; see also Harry H. Wellington, The Nature of 
Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 493 (1982) (observing that the authority of common law courts is seldom 
questioned, even when their opinions are controversial or unpopular). 
96.  See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 
97.  Donald Crowley & Florence Heffron, The Idaho State Constitution: A Reference Guide 4 
(1994). 
98.  Id. While the Framers’ desire for a limited government could indicate they would have been 
suspicious of a powerful judiciary, it suggests by the same token they would have desired the judiciary 
to retain authority to curb abuses of individual rights by other branches. See Schuman, supra note 93, at 
1201 (noting framers of the Montana Constitution distrusted “elitist courts.”). 
99.  See IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 6 (Supreme Court justices); IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 11 (district court 
judges). 
100.  See, e.g., Clark v. Jones Gledhill Fuhrman Gourley, P.A., 409 P.3d 795, 802, 163 Idaho 215, 
222 (2017) (quoting Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 416, 421, 129 Idaho 171, 176 (1996)). 
101.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979). Of course, the power 
to fashion a remedy does not settle the issue of what remedy is appropriate. Damages as a remedy for 
constitutional violations (as opposed to prospective injunctive relief), are often treated as an 
extraordinary form of relief, but at least one court has described this position as “ahistorical” and “upside 
down.” Godfrey v. State, 898 N.W.2d 844, 868 (Iowa 2017). “[I]n the common law regime, remedies at 
law—or damages—were usually the first choice to remedy a protected right. It is equitable remedies, 
not damage remedies, which reflected the innovation in the common law.” Id. 
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compensatory and exemplary damages was well established”102—and thus was 
presumably incorporated in the common law of Idaho.103  
III. TUCKER V. STATE AND THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT’S REJECTION OF 
“RIGHTS ESSENTIALISM” 
Of course, to say that the decisions limiting Bivens actions in federal courts 
should not be persuasive in Idaho does not establish that Idaho courts must 
recognize Bivens actions. Nonetheless, the recent case Tucker v. State indicates 
Bivens actions must be available under Idaho law, at least in certain 
circumstances.104 
Tucker’s bearing on the issue of implied constitutional damages is profound, 
but perhaps not immediately apparent. Tucker was a class action alleging systemic 
inadequacy of Idaho’s public defense system.105 The plaintiffs claimed that 
underfunded offices and excessive caseloads resulted in deprivation of federal and 
state constitutional guarantees of the right to counsel.106 Plaintiffs named the State 
of Idaho, the governor in his official capacity, and the seven members of the Idaho 
Public Defense Commission as defendants, seeking a declaratory judgment and an 
injunction requiring the state to bring the system into compliance with 
constitutional standards.107  
The state argued sovereign immunity shielded it from suit, but the Court 
rejected this argument.108 It held that sovereign immunity, as a creation of the 
common law, was within the Court’s power to modify, and that it would not allow 
the doctrine to prevent the vindication of state constitutional claims.109 In so doing, 
the Court expressly aligned itself with sister states whose high courts have held that 
allowing sovereign immunity as a defense against constitutional claims would 
“render constitutional rights meaningless.”110 The idea implicit in Tucker—that 
rights and remedies are logically coterminous—is not new in American law.111 But, 
 
102.  Godfrey v. State, 898 N.W.2d at 866 (discussing several famous English cases and citing 
William W. Greenhalgh & Mark J. Yost, In Defense of the “Per Se” Rule: Justice Stewart’s Struggle to 
Preserve the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013 (1994)). 
103.  See Idaho Code § 73-116 (2019) (first enacted as Idaho Terr. Sess. 1864, p. 527, § 1, 
adopting English common law as common law of Idaho); IDAHO CONST. art. XXI, § 2 (“All laws now in force 
in the territory of Idaho which are not repugnant to this Constitution shall remain in force[.]”); see 
generally, Louis F. del Duca & Alain A. Levasseur, Impact of Legal Culture and Legal Transplants on the 
Evolution of the U.S. Legal System, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 5 (2010).  
104.  Tucker v. State, 394 P.3d 54, 162 Idaho 11 (2017). 
105.  Id. at 59, 162 Idaho at 16. 
106.  Id. at 63, 162 Idaho at 20. 
107.  Id. at 59, 162 Idaho at 16. 
108.  Id. at 60–61, 162 Idaho at 17–18. 
109.  Id. at 61, 162 Idaho at 18. 
110.  Tucker, 394 P.3d at 61, 162 Idaho at 18. The sister jurisdictions cited by the Court are 
Connecticut, Florida, North Carolina, Maryland and Georgia.  
111.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“The very essence of civil liberty certainly 
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an 
injury.”). 
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as the Supreme Court’s decisions affirming incomplete or non-existent remedies in 
Bush and Chilicky demonstrate, neither is it a given. Indeed, the idea that “[r]ights 
are dependent on remedies not just for their application to the real world, but for 
their scope, shape, and very existence”—is often rejected or overlooked in federal 
constitutional jurisprudence.112 Daryl Levinson has called the philosophy 
undergirding these decisions “rights essentialism,” a key feature of which is the de-
linking of rights and remedies.113 Courts adopting a rights essentialist view regard 
themselves—by virtue of their insulation from politics—as uniquely capable to 
interpret constitutional rights.114 Yet because the political branches “possess not 
only democratic legitimacy but also superior fact-finding and interest-balancing 
capacities,” courts will “defer to the political branches about issues of implementing 
or enforcing rights.”115  
The differing capacities of the judicial and political branches do suggest 
deference to the political branches is often appropriate. However, by “depict[ing] 
causation as running only from rights to remedies,” rights essentialism is divorced 
from practical reality.116 Moreover, it provides a model of constitutional rights 
poorly suited to ensure their vindication, as it allows majoritarian pressures to limit 
remedies for constitutional wrongs.117 Thus, instead of preserving the legitimacy of 
government and the appropriate exercise of powers within separate branches, 
rights essentialism results in the abdication of judicial duty and the de-legitimizing 
of government as individual rights are subordinated to structural concerns.118  
Tucker stands as forceful repudiation of rights essentialism, rejecting not just 
its primary symptom—the de-linking of rights and remedies—but also its primary 
justification—an unduly restrictive take on the separation of powers doctrine. As 
an alternative to its sovereign immunity argument, the government in Tucker 
alleged the plaintiffs lacked standing due to separation of powers principles.119 The 
court soundly rejected this argument, emphasizing both its constitutional oversight 
role and its essential duty to ensure remediation of constitutional wrongs:  
Here, Appellants’ requested relief does not implicate the 
separation of powers doctrine. The right to counsel, which 
Appellants seek to vindicate, is not entrusted to a particular 
branch of government. Nor does a particular branch of 
government merely have discretion to enforce the right to 
counsel, a fundamental right. 
. . . . 
[I]f there be a legislative abdication of its power and duty, 
the courts will be required to act in the legislature's stead.  
. . . . 
 
112.  Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 
858–61 (May 1999). 
113.  Id. 
114.  Id. 
115.  Id. at 861. 
116.  Id. at 884. 
117.  Id. at 932. 
118.  Levinson, supra note 112, at 933. 
119.  Tucker, 394 P.3d at 61, 162 Idaho at 18.  
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It is, of course, possible that a remedy in this action would 
necessitate the appropriation of funds and perhaps, particularly 
in a time of scarcity, some reordering of legislative priorities. But 
this does not amount to an argument upon which a court might 
be relieved of its essential obligation to provide a remedy for 
violation of a fundamental constitutional right. . . . Merely that it 
is possible that Idaho's three branches of government may 
collaborate when deciding how to ensure our public defense 
system passes constitutional muster does not raise separation of 
powers concerns.120 
Hopefully the relevance of Tucker to Bivens actions in Idaho is now apparent: 
in a case similar to Webster Bivens’ but arising under the state constitution—a case 
where it is “damages or nothing”—Idaho courts cannot, consistent with Tucker, 
accord the plaintiff nothing. A right without a remedy is no right at all, and the 
failure of the legislature to provide such a remedy cannot relieve courts of its own 
“essential obligation” to uphold the state constitution. Consider, for instance, if the 
state legislature attempted to enact a statute overruling the holding in Tucker and 
reinstating sovereign immunity for state constitutional claims. The effect of such a 
statute, in the Court’s own words, would be to “render constitutional rights 
meaningless.”121 This, of course, would run contrary to the fundamental premise 
that “[t]he limitations of the constitution are binding upon the legislature, and 
cannot be nullified or avoided by the simple device of declaring them 
inapplicable.”122 If the legislature were to enact such a law, then, the court would 
be bound by its constitutional oversight duty to void it.123 Likewise the legislature 
cannot, by failing to enact a statute permitting the recovery of damages for 
constitutional violations, deny plaintiffs the ability to vindicate their constitutional 
rights. As the Iowa Supreme Court noted in a spirited decision affirming Bivens 
actions under that state’s constitution: “Just as the Legislature cannot abridge 
constitutional rights by its enactments, it cannot curtail them through its silence, 
and the judicial obligation to protect the fundamental rights of individuals is as old  
as this country.”124 
 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF BIVENS ACTIONS IN IDAHO  
 Tucker indicates that a direct cause of action for damages under the Idaho 
Constitution must be available, at least in some instances. However, implementing 
Bivens actions under the state constitution is an undertaking with potential to raise 
 
120.  Id. at 72–73, 162 Idaho 29-30 (emphasis added) (quotation marks and citations omitted) 
(quoting Hurrell-Harring v. New York, 930 N.E.2d 217, 227 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2010)). 
121.  Id. at 61, 162 Idaho at 18. 
122.  Moyie Springs v. Aurora Mfg. Co., 353 P.2d 767, 774, 82 Idaho 337, 348 (1960). 
123.  See id. 
124.  Godfrey v. State, 898 N.W.2d 844, 865 (Iowa 2017) (quoting King v. S. Jersey Nat’l Bank, 
330 A.2d 1, 10 (N.J. 1974)). 
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serious concerns among policymakers, the public, and the state judiciary. For 
policymakers and the public, one concern may be that actions under the state 
constitution would become a substitute for tort actions against the state or its 
officials. Such a result could trivialize constitutional rights and expose taxpayers to 
unbounded liability. For the judiciary, awarding money damages against the state 
may invite separation of powers criticisms which damage the perceived legitimacy 
of the courts, even if such awards are within their authority. Similarly, in cases 
where the plaintiff is politically unpopular and the alleged violator enjoys public 
support, damage awards may lead judges to be labeled “activists,” and even to be 
unseated.125 
In light of the foregoing, this Comment recommends a framework that 
ensures plaintiffs can fully vindicate their rights, yet reasonably limits state liability 
and respects the proper boundaries of the judicial role. Importantly, this framework 
does not parrot federal constitutional tort jurisprudence, but affirms the Idaho 
Constitution as an independently vital founding document. Not only does this 
comport with the “dignity and status” of Idaho as an independent sovereign,126 but 
by not following the federal model of constitutional rights enforcement, the 
framework proposed here is more straightforward, better suited to the state law 
context, and, arguably, more principled.127  
Bivens actions under the state constitution should be implemented by Idaho 
courts as follows: Where plaintiffs can prove violation of a self-executing provision 
of the state constitution, the state itself should be held strictly liable when the 
conduct causing injury is fairly attributable to the government. Equitable relief is 
preferred, but money damages must be available where equitable remedies would 
fail to make the plaintiff whole. Finally, where economic value of an injury is 
incalculable, courts should award only nominal damages unless deterring future 
violations warrants imposition of punitive damages. 
The rest of Part IV will explain how each piece of this framework can guide 
Idaho courts to fulfill their essential obligation to enforce the state constitution 
through recognition of Bivens actions under the state constitution—without 
 
125.  The risk of being unseated as the consequence of an unpopular decision is more than an 
abstraction in Idaho. In 2000, Idaho Supreme Court Justice Cathy Silak lost her re-election bid as the 
result of a controversial water rights decision which incensed Idaho’s agricultural community. Justice 
Faces Unusual Election Challenge, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW at A7 (Apr. 24, 2000), 
https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=0klj8wIChNAC&dat=20000424&printsec=frontpage&hl=en; 
Mark Warbis, Newest Idaho Justice Wins Praise at Swearing-in, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW at B1 (Jan. 3, 2001), 
https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=dY9XAAAAIBAJ&sjid=T_IDAAAAIBAJ&pg=3195%2C563824. 
126.  Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 287 (1997). 
127.  As discussed in Part II above, state courts have been inappropriately influenced by 
constriction of the Bivens remedy in federal courts despite the fact that the primary reason for that 
constriction—a limited view of inherent federal remedial authority—is misplaced in state courts of 
general jurisdiction. The framework proposed here also avoids problems presented by applying federal 
jurisprudence interpreting 42 U.S.C. section 1983 to state constitutional claims, an approach taken by 
several state courts. See, e.g., Kuchcinski v. Box Elder Cty., 2019 UT 21, ¶26 n.33 (“[W]e frequently 
borrow principles from Section 1983 jurisprudence . . . when determining the contours of liability when 
[state] constitutional rights have been violated.”). An account of the inaptness of Section 1983 
jurisprudence to protect state constitutional rights is beyond the scope of this Comment, but for a 
thoughtful critique see Gary S. Gildin, Redressing Deprivations of Rights Secured by State Constitutions 
Outside the Shadow of the Supreme Court's Constitutional Remedies Jurisprudence, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 
877 (2011).  
2020 THE IMPLIED CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DAMAGES UNDER 






exceeding the proper role of the judiciary and in accord with Tucker’s rejection of 
rights essentialism. 
A. The constitutional provision allegedly violated must be self-executing 
Sometimes whether a constitutional provision is enforceable in money 
damages is presented as a question of whether a clause is “self-executing.”128 
Precisely speaking, however, whether a provision is “self-executing” involves 
determining whether a provision is judicially enforceable in any instance, without 
regard to what remedies are appropriate.129 Nonetheless, since determining 
whether a provision is judicially enforceable at all is logically prior to whether it may 
be enforced with a Bivens action, courts should begin by considering whether a 
provision is self-executing.130  
A self-executing constitutional provision is one that is binding of its own force 
without requiring legislative action.131 Thus, a provision which expressly directs the 
legislature to enact a legislative scheme to implement the provision is not self-
executing.132 Also, a provision may not be self-executing if it “merely indicates 
principles, without laying down rules by means of which those principles may be 
given the force of law.”133 By contrast, a provision will be regarded as self-executing 
if it “supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the right given may be enjoyed 
and protected, or the duty imposed may be enforced.”134  
 
128.  See, e.g., Dorwart v. Caraway, 58 P.3d 128, 156 (Mont. 2002) (Gray, C.J. dissenting) 
(arguing that state due process clause should not support a cause of action for damages because it is not 
self-executing); Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 413 S.E.2d 276, 289 (N.C. 1992) (holding the state right to free 
speech supports a cause of action for damages because it is self-executing). 
129.  FRIESEN, supra note 211, § 7.05, 7-10-7-11.9. 
130.  Though not implicating self-execution, another textual limitation on the cognizability of 
constitutional claims bears mention here. Some matters could be so clearly committed by a constitution 
to the political branches that judicial interference would be impermissible. This has arisen at the federal 
level in cases involving affairs of the military and national security. See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 
1843, 1856-57 (2017) (declining to extend Bivens remedies to aliens detained in the aftermath of the 
September 11th attacks, citing, among other reasons, commitment of national security issues to the 
executive branch); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 686 (1987) (declining to extend Bivens 
remedies to plaintiffs to recover for injuries sustained as result of secret administration of LSD as part of 
an Army experiment). The relevance of this limitation in Idaho is questionable. While it is not 
inconceivable that a provision such as IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“governor shall be commander-in-chief 
of the military forces of the state”) could prevent Bivens liability in a particular case, it seems improbable 
this would arise with any frequency. 
131.  Self-executing provision, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969) (“A provision of a 
constitution which is effective without legislation, no action by the legislature being required to put it in 
operation.”). 
132.  See, e.g., Idaho State AFL-CIO v. Leroy, 718 P.2d 1129, 1134, 110 Idaho 691, 696 (1986) 
(holding that article III, section 1 of the Idaho constitution which grants referendum power is not self-
executing because it provides that the power is to be exercised “under such conditions and in such 
manner as may be provided by acts of the legislature”). 
133.  Haile v. Foote, 409 P.2d 409, 411, 90 Idaho 261, 266 (1965) (quoting Davis v. Burke, 179 
U.S. 399 (1900)). 
134.  Id. 
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The Idaho Supreme Court has only expressly found two provisions of the Idaho 
Constitution to be self-executing,135 but it is likely that most of the rights 
enumerated in the Idaho Declaration of Rights are self-executing.136 The Court has 
held that mandatory or prohibitory language in constitutional provisions is 
presumed to be self-executing,137 and most of the rights guaranteed by the Idaho 
Constitution are phrased in such terms. These include the rights to religious 
liberty138 and habeas corpus;139 the rights to reasonable bail and to be free from 
cruel and unusual punishment;140 the rights to trial by jury,141 freedom of speech,142 
and freedom of assembly;143 the rights to open courts, counsel, and due process;144 
and the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.145 Thus, most of the 
individual rights guaranteed by the Idaho Constitution satisfy at least the threshold 
requirement of judicial enforceability.146  
 
B. The state or its political subdivisions should be held strictly liable where the 
conduct causing injury is fairly attributable to the government 
“Conceptually the government is the inescapable defendant in a 
constitutional tort suit; only the government can abridge constitutional rights.”147 
Yet, a government can only act through its officers. Thus, implementing Bivens 
 
135.  The right to a speedy trial guaranteed by article 1, section 13 was found to be self-
executing in Jacobson v. Winter, 415 P.2d 297, 300, 91 Idaho 11, 14 (1966). The right to justice without 
prejudice guaranteed by article 1, section 18 was found to be self-executing in Day v. Day, 86 P. 531, 
523, 12 Idaho 556, 562 (1906).  
136.  The Idaho Declaration of Rights was adopted as Article I of the Idaho Constitution. See 
Donald Crowley & Florence Heffron, The Idaho State Constitution: A Reference Guide 4 (1994). 
137.  See State v. Vill. of Garden City, 265 P.2d 328, 334, 74 Idaho 513, 526 (1953) (citing Katz v. 
Herrick, 86 P. 873, 878, 12 Idaho 1, 25 (1906) (Ailshie, J., on rehearing) (“It is quite uniformly held that 
all negative or prohibitory clauses in mandatory or prohibitive form are of themselves self-operative as 
to the subject-matter or thing to be prohibited or denied.”)). 
138.  IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 4 (“[N]o person shall be denied any civil or political right, privilege, or 
capacity on account of his religious opinions . . . .”). 
139.  Id. § 5 (“The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended . . . .”). 
140.  Id. § 6 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excess fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
141.  Id. § 7 (“The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate . . . .”). 
142.  Id. § 9 (“Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects . . . .”). 
143.  Id. § 10 (“The people shall have the right to assemble in a peaceable manner . . . .”). 
144.  IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13 (“In all criminal prosecutions, the party accused shall have the right 
to a speedy and public trial; to have the process of the court to compel the attendance of witnesses in 
his behalf, and to appear and defend in person and with counsel. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy 
for the same offense; nor be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; nor be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.”). 
145.  Id. § 17 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated . . . .”). 
146.  Cf. Shields v. Gerhart, 658 A.2d 924, 928 (Vt. 1995) (holding a section of the Vermont 
Constitution substantially similar to Article I, section 1 of the Idaho Constitution is not self-executing). 
147.  A Theory of Negligence for Constitutional Torts, 92 YALE L.J. 683, 697 (1983); see also Corum 
v. Univ. of N.C., 413 S.E.2d 276, 292–93 (N.C. 1992) (holding that state officers may not be held 
individually liable for state constitutional violations because “‘We, the people,’ created the Constitution 
and the government of our State in order to limit our actions as the body politic. The Constitution is 
intended to protect our rights as individuals from our actions as the government. The Constitution is not 
intended to protect our rights vis-a-vis other individuals.”). 
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actions raises the question of who may be properly named as defendant—the 
government, the officer, or both. Additionally, it must be determined what level of 
culpability is required to expose a party to liability. For the reasons set forth below, 
the state or its political subdivisions are the only proper defendants in an implied 
action for damages under the Idaho Constitution and they should be held strictly 
liable for state constitutional violations.  
i. The state or its political subdivisions are the sole proper defendants  
Where liability is based upon a judicially created cause of action, only the 
government can properly be named a defendant. States may apportion risk 
between the government and its officers for state constitutional violations under a 
number of different models to advance different policy objectives.148 For example, 
a state could seek to maximize deterrence by holding both the government and 
public officials liable.149 On the other hand, if a state fears the threat of liability 
would steer qualified individuals away from public service or interfere with public 
servants’ execution of their duties, it may choose to afford officers immunity.150 
Balancing these policy considerations, however, is the province of the legislature 
not the courts.151 Instead, a judicially created remedy should be crafted as narrowly 
as possible to remedy constitutional injuries, leaving it to the legislature to address 
any accompanying policy matters. Thus, the state or its political subdivisions should 
be the defendant in a Bivens action under the state constitution, assuring a remedy 
for every constitutional wrong, but leaving additional matters of risk-sharing and 
indemnification to the legislature. 
It could be argued that the same objective would be achieved by holding only 
the officer liable for constitutional violations. This is not a tenable position for two 
reasons. First, holding the officer solely responsible is inconsistent with the purpose 
of the Idaho Constitution as a constraint ultimately on state power, not on 
individual conduct. Second, because individuals are much less likely to be able to 
satisfy a judgment than the state, such a scheme could undermine the full 
vindication of constitutional rights by providing incomplete or illusory remedies.  
 
ii. Defendants should be subject to strict liability, but only when the conduct 
causing injury is fairly attributable to the government 
The degree of culpability of a party violating the Idaho Constitution should not 
be an element of Bivens actions in Idaho. Culpability standards are a frequent 
 
148.  See Gary S. Gildin, Redressing Deprivations of Rights Secured by State Constitutions 
Outside the Shadow of the Supreme Court's Constitutional Remedies Jurisprudence, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 
877, 917 (2011). 
149.  Id. 
150.  Id. at 918. 
151.  Idaho State AFL-CIO v. Leroy, 718 P.2d 1129, 1136, 110 Idaho 691, 698 (1986) (“[T]he 
judicial branch of government must respect and defer to the legislature's exclusive policy decisions. Such 
is the very nature of our tripartite representative form of government.”). 
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feature of constitutional tort law at the federal level and in other states. For 
example, in Utah plaintiffs must establish they suffered a “flagrant” violation of 
their state constitutional rights to maintain a private suit for damages,152 and in 
federal court public officials are immune from liability so long as their actions do 
not “violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.”153 Such standards seek to control the 
extent of liability in light of “the ordinary ‘human frailties of forgetfulness, 
distractibility, [and] misjudgment’”154 as well as, in the federal context, to allay 
federalism concerns raised by suits against local governments under federal law.155  
Culpability as a precondition of liability, however, means constitutional harms 
caused without the requisite degree of fault must remain unremedied. Yet, the 
degree of fault of the party causing an injury simply has no bearing on the extent of 
the injury suffered. Therefore, if rights and remedies exist in a 1:1 correlation, full 
vindication of state constitutional rights requires strict liability. 
At first blush, it might appear that recognition of a Bivens action under the 
Idaho Constitution subject to a strict liability standard would result in a radical 
transformation of the nature and extent of governmental liability. This concern is 
perhaps most acute in the context of Idaho’s due process clause.156 The State of 
Idaho employs more than twenty-five thousand people,157 and local governments 
certainly employ many more thousands. If every misstep committed by a public 
servant in the course of employment—intentional or unintentional, negligent or 
despite due care—resulted in a constitutional claim whenever it caused a loss of 
life, liberty, or property, the consequences could be profound.  
First, recasting common torts as constitutional claims could allow plaintiffs to 
skirt the limitations of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. Enacted in 1971, the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act (ITCA) is a partial abrogation of state sovereign immunity for tort 
claims.158 The ITCA allows plaintiffs to sue governmental entities and their 
employees for money damages for injuries arising from conduct “where the 
governmental entity if a private person or entity would be liable for money 
damages under the laws of the state of Idaho,” subject to some exceptions.159 Since 
the ITCA already provides a route for plaintiffs to redress many injuries which may 
be cognizable as due process claims, it is not clear if the number of suits brought 
against the government would substantially increase after recognition of a state 
Bivens action. However, because the ITCA also imposes a damage cap to limit the 
state’s liability and requires plaintiffs to follow a number of procedural steps not 
required in tort claims against private parties,160 the extent of liability could 
dramatically expand in the absence of some limiting principle.  
 
152.  Kuchcinski v. Box Elder Cty., 2019 UT 21, ¶23, 450 P.3d 1056, 1064. 
153.  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1982). 
154.  Kuchcinski, 2019 UT 21, ¶22. 
155.  Bd. of the Cty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997). 
156.  Idaho’s due process clause is found at IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13. 
157.  Current Employee Counts, TRANSPARENT IDAHO, 
https://transparentdata.idaho.gov/transparency#/29329/query=BA3A5343CE498A38739FA4D0938F5
C7A&embed=n (last updated Jan. 20, 2020). 
158.  See Idaho Tort Claims Act, IDAHO CODE §§ 6-901–6-929 (2019).   
159.  Id. § 6-903.   
160.  Id. § 6-926 (capping damages at $500,000 per occurrence); Id. §§ 6-905 to 6-907 
(establishing procedures and time limits for notifying governmental defendants before initiating suit). 
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Second, state constitutional rights would be trivialized if all common torts by 
government employees became constitutional claims. Justice Stewart’s 
concurrence in Parratt v. Taylor161 captures this concern. Parratt involved a Section 
1983 claim by a prisoner against prison officials over the loss of a $23.50 mail-order 
hobby kit.162 Though Parratt arose under the federal constitution, Justice Stewart’s 
observation about the nature of interests the due process clause protects is apt 
here:  
It seems to me extremely doubtful that the property loss 
here, even though presumably caused by the negligence of state 
agents, is the kind of deprivation of property to which the 
Fourteenth Amendment is addressed. If it is, then so too would 
be damages to a person's automobile resulting from a collision 
with a vehicle negligently operated by a state official. To hold that 
this kind of loss is a deprivation of property within the meaning 
of the Fourteenth Amendment seems not only to trivialize, but 
grossly to distort the meaning and intent of the Constitution.163  
 In Daniels v. Williams, the United States Supreme Court resolved similar 
concerns by holding that Bivens actions may not be based on negligent conduct 
because “mere negligence could not work a deprivation in the constitutional 
sense.”164 According to the Court, injuries caused by routine negligence are “quite 
remote” from the ills the due process clause was intended to address: “Far from an 
abuse of power, lack of due care suggests no more than a failure to measure up to 
the conduct of a reasonable person.”165  
The Court’s reasoning, however, is flawed and should not be adopted in Idaho. 
While the Daniels rule properly excludes random and unauthorized acts of low-level 
officials from constitutional significance, it fails to account for the reality that a lack 
of due care on the part of several officials—or even a single official in a position of 
authority—may constitute more than a failure to measure up to the conduct of a 
reasonable person, but a failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable 
government. 
 Instead of Daniels’ greater-than-negligence culpability requirement, Idaho 
should adopt a rule that the state or its political subdivisions are strictly liable (to 
assure full vindication of constitutional rights), but only where the conduct causing 
violation of the state constitution is fairly attributable to the government (to assure 
only appropriate claims are cognizable as constitutional issues). Under this scheme, 
the unauthorized acts of most government employees—whether negligent or 
intentional—would not amount to constitutional violations because the 
constitution is intended to constrain the conduct of the government and such 
 
161.  Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 
(1986). 
162.  Id. at 529. 
163.  Id. at 544–45 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
164.  474 U.S. 327, 330 (quoting Parratt, 451 U.S. at 548–49 (Powell, J., concurring in the result) 
(internal punctuation omitted)). 
165.  Id. at 332. 
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conduct, by its unpredictable and unauthorized nature, will generally not amount 
to government action.166 However, where a plaintiff could prove his or her injury 
was caused by conduct attributable to the government, a cause of action would be 
available under the constitution.  
Conduct fairly attributable to the government would include any intentional 
act resulting from de jure or de facto policy or procedure, as well as acts or 
omissions amounting to negligent governance. Under a “negligent government” 
theory, failure to institute or enforce policies which could reasonably be expected 
to prevent constitutional violations would expose the government entity to liability 
in the same manner as affirmative government acts. Thus, for example, 
unauthorized use of excessive force by a prison guard would not, by itself, be 
conduct attributable to the government. However, if a plaintiff were able to prove 
negligent hiring or negligent supervision of the same guard, the government could 
be held liable.   
 This rule limits liability on a principled basis, promotes responsible 
governance, and—because determining fair attributability to the government 
amounts to little more than a traditional tort law proximate causation analysis—it 
would likely be easier to apply than the labyrinthine system of qualified immunities 
employed to limit liability under Section 1983.  
C. Equitable relief is preferred, but money damages must be available where 
equitable remedies would fail to make the plaintiff whole 
Though the existence of a right logically requires a remedy,167 it does not 
necessarily imply a particular type of remedy. While this Comment focuses on 
money damages as a remedy for constitutional violations, it does so not because 
money damages are preferable to equitable relief, but because the authority of 
courts to award equitable relief is already well established. Indeed, equitable relief 
should be preferred and money damages should only be available when equitable 
relief is inadequate to make a plaintiff whole.  
Equitable relief should be preferred for at least two reasons. First, though 
Tucker clearly supports that a judgment does not violate separation of powers 
principles simply because it requires an appropriation of funds,168 separation of 
powers concerns should not be taken lightly. A judicial preference for equitable 
remedies over monetary damages is appropriate to respect the cabined roles of the 
three branches of state government.169 Second, in some regards equitable relief is 
better suited to the vindication of constitutional rights than monetary damages.170 
Prospective injunctive relief will often benefit a much wider segment of the public, 
not just the plaintiff bringing suit, and it avoids the perception that constitutional 
 
166.  This does not mean victims of injuries caused by government employees will necessarily 
be without a remedy, only that a cause of action does not arise under the state constitution. Plaintiffs 
injured by government officers will often have recourse under the ITCA, or under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 
to the extent the state constitution overlaps with provisions of the federal constitution.  
167.  See supra Part III. 
168.  Tucker v. State, 394 P.3d 54, 72, 162 Idaho 11, 29 (2017). 
169.  See IDAHO CONST. art. II, § 1. 
170.  Christina B. Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 42 (1980); see Vicki C. 
Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 91-
93 (1988). 
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rights can or should be “monetized.”171 Likewise, monetary awards for past wrongs 
are unlikely to be as effective as a means to deter officials from future violations 
than forward-looking relief.172 Thus, while money damages are essential to assure 
the vitality of constitutional rights where it is “damages or nothing,”173 they should 
only be awarded to the extent that equitable relief would fail to make a plaintiff 
whole. 
D. Where an injury cannot be redressed by equitable relief, but its economic value 
is imponderable, courts should award only nominal damages unless deterring 
future violations warrants imposition of punitive damages 
Generally, Idaho courts should award only nominal damages if the economic 
measure of economic harm caused by a violation of the state constitution is 
speculative or beyond the competence of the courts to assess. In Bivens, both the 
majority and Justice Harlan noted that the plaintiff’s injury was of a sort traditionally 
compensable in damages.174 “[E]xperience of judges in dealing with private trespass 
and false imprisonment claims supports the conclusion that courts of law are 
capable of making the types of judgment concerning causation and magnitude of 
injury necessary to accord meaningful compensation for invasion of Fourth 
Amendment rights.”175 However, some constitutional injuries may not be readily 
compensable in money damages.176  
For instance, in the context of procedural due process rights, plaintiffs may be 
able to present proof of a constitutional violation, but the existence of an economic 
injury may be only speculative. For example, in a California case, a shellfish 
producer sought damages alleging that failure of a state agency to process an 
application prevented it from marketing its product out -of -state violated its due 
process rights.177 Though the unconstitutional denial of an administrative hearing 
could be proved, the court dismissed the claim in part because the plaintiff 
presented “little or no evidence linking the absence of a hearing to the ultimate 
damages.”178 
In other circumstances, fixing an economic measure of damages may be 
beyond the traditional competence of the courts. Many constitutional violations—
such as infringement of the right to free speech, or to bear arms, or to vote—do not 
 
171.  Jackson, supra note 1701, at 92–93. 
172.  See Whitman, supra note 1701, at 49–50; see also infra Part IV.d (regarding money 
damages as a deterrent for individual officials where, as proposed here, only the state or its political 
subdivisions may be named defendant).  
173.  See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
174.  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395-
96 (1971); Id. at 408–09 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
175.  Id. at 409 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
176.  Cf. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 409 n.9. (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]he appropriateness of money 
damages may well vary with the nature of the personal interest asserted.”). 
177.  Carlsbad Aquafarm, Inc. v. State Dep't of Health Servs., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 87, 89–90 (Ct. 
App. 2000). 
178.  Id. at 96. 
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have clear analogs in common law causes of action. Thus, unless the violation leads 
to concrete consequential damages (e.g., lost wages of a state employee 
terminated in violation of her free speech rights), fashioning a compensatory 
damages remedy would involve policy considerations properly delegated to the 
legislature. Further, as Justice Harlan observed in Monroe v. Pape, there are many 
cases—such as denial of the franchise—where, even if it were possible for the court 
to calculate the cost of damages, these would be “far less than what Congress may 
have thought would be fair reimbursement for deprivation of a constitutional 
right.”179  
In cases such as these, Idaho courts should vindicate plaintiffs’ constitutional 
rights by awarding nominal damages, in addition to any appropriate equitable 
relief. By awarding nominal damages, even without proof of an injury or its 
magnitude, courts can affirm the paramount significance of constitutional rights 
and “recognize[] the importance to organized society that those rights be 
scrupulously observed[,]” without giving a windfall to plaintiffs who are unable to 
prove their damages.180 Further, while the promise of nominal damages is unlikely 
to prompt plaintiffs to endure the stress and expense of a lawsuit, the availability 
of nominal damages may nonetheless encourage plaintiffs to vindicate their rights 
that otherwise would not be vindicated. First, though some courts have held that 
an award of actual damages is required to support an award of punitive damages,181 
Idaho follows the rule that nominal damages are sufficient to support a punitive 
award.182 Second, a party winning nominal damages may be a “prevailing party” 
within the meaning of both state and federal fee-shifting statutes,183 as well as 
Idaho’s rule assigning court and litigation costs.184 Note however, that courts retain 
discretion to adjust the amount of awards based on the degree of success obtained; 
thus if a plaintiff’s sole victory in litigation is an award of nominal damages, the 
amount of fees allowed may be low or none at all.185  
In some instances, however, compensatory and nominal damages may not be 
enough for a court to fulfill its imperative to ensure the vitality of state 
constitutional rights. “When a constitutional violation is involved, more than a mere 
allocation of risk and compensation is implicated.”186 Rather, punitive damages may 
sometimes be appropriate for deterrence and to express “sharp social disapproval” 
 
179.  Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 n.5 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring), overruled by Monell 
v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
180.  Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978). 
181.  See Kemner v. Monsanto Co., 576 N.E.2d 1146, 1153 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). 
182.  Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 95 P.3d 977, 985, 140 Idaho 495, 503 (2004).  
183.  Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112 (1992) (fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988); Massey-Ferguson 
Credit Corp. v. Peterson, 626 P.2d 767, 777, 102 Idaho 111, 121 (1980) (fees under Idaho Code § 12-
121); see also Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 682 P.2d 524, 531, 106 Idaho 571, 578 (1984) (awarding attorney’s 
fees under the private attorney general doctrine). Recovery of fees under federal law for violation of 
state constitutional provisions is possible where state law claims (which are often brought parallel with 
federal claims) are within the supplemental jurisdiction of the federal courts. See generally FRIESEN, supra 
note 2, §§ 10.04–10.06. Notably, success on the federal claims to which the state claim is pendant is 
generally not a requirement for recovery of attorney’s fees under section 1988. Id.  
184.  Idaho R. Civ. P. 54. 
185.  Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114; Massey-Ferguson, 626 P.2d at 777, 102 Idaho at 121. 
186.  Godfrey v. State, 898 N.W.2d 844, 877 (Iowa 2017). 
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when public officials intentionally or recklessly violate constitutional rights.187 The 
importance of punitive damages to enforce constitutional rights has been widely 
recognized,188 including, notably, by the Supreme Court in Carlson v. Green.189 
Though the Supreme Court’s posture toward Bivens remedies has changed 
dramatically,190 it is significant that the unavailability of punitive damages was a 
factor supporting the Court’s holding in Carlson that the plaintiff’s statutory remedy 
was not “equally effective” as a Bivens remedy.191 
Nevertheless, punitive damages should only be available in actions directly 
under the Idaho Constitution where the need to deter officials from 
unconstitutional conduct is most acute, such as in circumstances where officials are 
shown to have personal or political incentives to violate or allow violations of the 
constitution. Limiting the availability of punitive damages in such a way is 
appropriate because the efficacy of punitive damages in a Bivens action as proposed 
in this Comment—where the government itself is the only proper defendant—is 
certain to be weaker than where officials bear personal liability, such as in federal 
Bivens actions or Section 1983 lawsuits.192 Indeed, some courts and commentators 
have maintained that punitive damages are not appropriate against the 
government at all because they impose costs on taxpayers, yet without personal 
liability officials will not be deterred from causing violations.193 This view ignores, 
however, that when an official’s conduct creates an avoidable economic burden on 
taxpayers, the official is likely to bear political costs as taxpayers recognize the 
official’s responsibility for squandering limited public resources.194 Thus, while 
punitive damages should be available as a remedial tool in Bivens actions under the 
Idaho Constitution, the indirect mode of accountability and concomitantly 
diminished deterrent effect of punitive damages against the state counsel’s sparing 
and judicious use of the remedy. 
 
187.  Id. (quoting Thomas J. Madden et al., Bedtime for Bivens: Substituting the United States as 
Defendant in Constitutional Tort Suits, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 469, 489–90 (1983) (quotation marks 
omitted)). 
188.  See, e.g., Godfrey, 898 N.W.2d at 877–79 (discussing decisions from federal, state, and 
British common law courts). 
189.  446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980). 
190.  See supra Part II.b. 
191.  Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19. 
192.  See Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts, 
Constitutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 860 (2007) (observing that the most effective 
means to “impress upon an official . . . the magnitude of legal risk inhering in a particular course of 
action,” is to discuss “the possibility of an award of punitive damages, for which they c[an] not be 
indemnified.”). 
193.  See Godfrey, 898 N.W.2d at 894 n.15 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (quoting 57 Am. Jur. 2d 
Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability § 611, at 620 (2012)). 
194.  Rosenthal, supra note 193, at 832. Note that the pre-requisite to Bivens liability that 
violations be fairly attributable to the government, see supra Part IV.b.2, ensures that, as a practical 
matter, any successful Bivens action under the Idaho Constitution will involve violations proximately 
caused by the acts or omissions of one or more officials with policy-making authority. Many officials with 
policy-making authority are elected to their offices or appointed by elected officials, providing a route 
by which those officials may be held accountable. The likelihood of deterrence in each particular case 
should be considered, however, before punitive damages are allowed. 




The Idaho Constitution is a source of individual rights independent from the 
federal constitution, and Idaho courts should recognize a cause of action that 
accounts for these differences. While the Federal District Court for the District of 
Idaho has held Bivens actions are not available under the state constitution, it 
reached this conclusion without analyzing Idaho law and in error. Because Tucker 
recognizes that state constitutional rights are meaningless without meaningful 
remedies to enforce them, Bivens actions must be available under Idaho law. 
Accordingly, this Comment has proposed scheme that allows for the full vindication 
of Idaho constitutional rights while respecting the limited role of the judiciary. 
